We examine the consequences of compressing secondary schooling for university enrollment. An unusual education reform in Germany reduced the length of academic high school while simultaneously increasing the instruction hours in the remaining years. Accordingly, students receive the same amount of schooling but over a shorter period of time. Based on a difference-indifferences approach and using administrative data on all students in Germany, we find that this reform decreased university enrollment rates. Moreover, students are more likely to delay their enrollment, to drop out of university, and to change their major. We discuss supply-side restrictions, age differences, and increased workload during school as potential mechanisms and present back-of-the-envelope cost-benefit considerations showing that the earnings gain from an extended labor market participation may still
I. Introduction
It is well established that more education is beneficial across an array of dimensions (see, for example, Card 1999; Lochner 2011) . At the same time, the more years individuals spend in education, the later they enter the labor market. Hence, there is a tradeoff between an earlier labor market entry and constant levels of education. In light of aging populations, this tradeoff is particularly relevant for countries trying to increase the pool of active labor market participants by allowing for earlier labor market entries.
There are several proposals to reduce the age at labor market entry, but the existing literature suggests that these have negative consequences. Lowering the general school starting age (Bedard and Dhuey 2012) , shortening the school year (Pischke 2007) , reducing the number of years required for specific degrees (Webbink 2007; Morin 2013; Krashinsky 2014) , and reducing the years of compulsory schooling (see, for example, Card 1999 ) are found to have adverse effects on students' educational and labor market outcomes.
An unusual education reform in Germany bears the potential to decrease the length of schooling without compromising other education outcomes. This so-called G8 reform, implemented between 2007 and 2016, reduced the number of years of schooling necessary to earn the university entrance qualification at academic high schools, while simultaneously increasing instruction hours in the remaining years in order to avoid detrimental effects on students' human capital. In this setting, students receive the same amount of schooling but over a shorter period of time. From an individual's perspective, this clearly marks an efficiency gain.
The G8 reform did not just spark a lively discussion regarding the potential negative effects for affected students due to the higher workload and the younger age at graduation, but also stimulated a growing literature on this topic-see Huebener and Marcus (2015) for an overview of existing studies. Most of these studies are confined to the short-term consequences of the reform, either examining students during or at the end of high school. This paper studies medium-term consequences of this unusual reform that are related to the goal of earlier labor market entries and to human capital acquisition: (i) enrollment rates in university, (ii) the timing of enrollment, and (iii) students' progress at university. We exploit the differential timing of the G8 reform implementation across German states in a difference-in-differences setting. Relying on administrative data on the universe of students in Germany, we find that the G8 reform decreases the share of students who enroll in university within one year after high school graduation by about six percentage points (pp), which corresponds to a decrease of around 7.3 percent. The impact on enrollment rates within two or three years after graduation is of similar magnitude, suggesting that enrollment rates do not catch up.
Further, we find evidence that the achievement of the reform's main goal in bringing university graduates earlier to the labor market is mitigated: As a consequence of the reform, students are 6.8 pp (or 9.6%) more likely to delay their enrollment and 2.6 pp (or 3.2%) less likely to make expected progress during their first year at university. The latter is explained by a higher probability to drop out of university and a higher probability to change majors. The negative reform effects seem to be general consequences of the reform, as we find little evidence for effect heterogeneity between states or genders. Moreover, we look at several subsequent treatment cohorts and show that the reform effects are not only of transitory nature but mostly persist across cohorts. We perform a battery of robustness checks and falsification exercises to support the identifying assumption of common trends in the outcome variables in treatment and control states.
We also present a rough cost-benefit calculation in which we examine whether the earnings gain from the extended labor market participation can offset the earnings loss of graduates who do not enter or delay their university education due to the reform. We use the difference in average lifetime earnings in a cohort under the G9 and the G8 regime as an indicator for the reforms' net benefit and show that the overall monetary reform effect will be positive. However, the adverse effects obtained in this study strongly reduce the reform's benefit.
We discuss three main mechanisms that may drive our results. First, a shortage of university slots may explain the decrease in enrollment rates (supply-side restrictions). Second, students' age at high school graduation is reduced by the one-year reduction in the length of academic high school (age channel). Younger students might be more likely to prefer present gains over higher future gains (Lavecchia, Liu, and Oreopoulos 2016) , thus making university education less attractive. Additionally, students at high school graduation now have one year less time for orientation, less time to discover their talents, and less time to develop their preferences, which might increase uncertainty about postsecondary educational choices. If students are aware of their relative age advantage, this may further entice them to take things more slowly and to delay their enrollment decisions. Third, and finally, the compensating increase of instruction hours in the remaining years implies a higher weekly workload as measured by weekly instruction hours (workload channel). Students able to meet these higher requirements may be even better prepared for the learning requirements at university. However, for some students the higher workload may reduce the desire and motivation for further learning (Jürges and Schneider 2010) . Additionally, for students who are unable to cope with the higher workload, this may result in worse performance.
We do not find any evidence that our results are driven by a shortage of university slots. In order to investigate whether the age difference between students is driving our results, we restrict our sample-before and after the reform-to students of the same age. This does not affect our main results substantially, suggesting that the age channel does not play a major role in explaining our findings and that our results can rather be attributed to the workload channel. Drawing on an additional data set, the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), we further strengthen this conclusion. In this supplementary analysis, we find that the reform indeed worsens students' school grades and increases the likelihood of hiring private tutors during high school.
The relevance of the workload channel is further supported by previous research on the G8 reform. This previous literature provides evidence of slightly weaker performance at the end of school (Büttner and Thomsen 2013; Hübner, Marcus, and Kruger 2017) , increased grade repetition rates , higher experienced levels of stress (Quis 2018) , and less time for working in a side job . Further, these studies show that affected students feel more strained by learning , are more extroverted, and less emotionally stable (Dahmann and Anger 2014) . 1. Yet, the evidence with respect to the impact on personality traits is mixed as Thiel, Thomsen, and Büttner (2014) do not find an effect of the G8 reform on students' personality traits.
While previous studies mostly examine short-term effects of the G8 reform, the working paper by Meyer, Thomsen, and Schneider (2015) is the only other study looking at postsecondary education choices based on data covering multiple German states. 2 Their findings suggest an increase in the probability of spending a year abroad or performing voluntary services. The study further finds that students affected by the reform are around 15 pp less likely to enroll in university in the year of high school graduation. However, by only considering enrollments in the year of graduation, the study cannot disentangle the effect on the timing of enrollment from the impact on students' actual enrollment choices as students might just start studying later.
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The results of our study are not only informative for the German context but also for policymakers in other countries who are trying to increase the number of active labor market participants in order to address the challenges of an aging society. Our study shows, however, that it is not easy to get around the tradeoff between constant levels of education and an earlier labor market entry. 4 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II we provide details about the reform implementation. Section III introduces the data and describes the construction of our outcome variables, while Section IVoutlines the empirical approach. Section V presents the empirical evidence of the reform effects on higher education decisions. In Section VI we show the robustness of these results to various model specifications. Section VII examines effect heterogeneity, including gender and state-specific treatment effects, as well as the development of the treatment effect over time. A discussion on potential channels is addressed in Section VIII, while Section IX discusses implications of the findings from a cost-benefit perspective. Section X concludes.
II. The G8 Reform
In most German states students complete four years of primary schooling before being assigned to different tracks of secondary schooling based on their ability. The G8 reform analyzed in this study affects only one of these tracks, the academic high school (Gymnasium), which is the high-ability track that prepares students for university. It is attended by about one-third of each cohort.
The idea of the G8 reform is to shorten the length of academic high school without affecting students' human capital. The intermediate aim of the reform is to allow young people an earlier labor market entry, thereby helping to achieve three further goals. First, to increase the number of contributors to the public pay-as-you-go pension system, 2. In addition, Thomsen (2016, 2018) analyze medium-term consequences of the reform based on the so-called double graduation in the federal state of Saxony-Anhalt. However, due to the elimination of the last school year, G8 students in this cohort graduated together with the last cohort of the previous regime, which could affect postsecondary education choices due to the larger cohort size (Bound and Turner 2007; Morin 2015a ) and the increased competition for university resources (Morin 2015b) . Thus, it is unclear to what extent the results based on one double cohort in a single state are also valid for later cohorts and other German states. 3. Additionally, we show that the last pretreatment cohort had strong incentives for speedy enrollment in order to avoid beginning to study with the double graduation cohort. Not taking this into account, as in Meyer, Thomsen, and Schneider (2015) , leads to an overestimation of the effect on enrollment rates. 4. Note that as the reform was only implemented recently, it is not yet possible to examine outcomes at labor market entry directly. Only a small and highly selective group of affected students are already on the labor market.
Figure 1
Timing of the G8 Reform in the German States Notes: The figure illustrates the treatment status of different graduation cohorts in the German states. *Hesse implemented the reform over various years and is not included in our main analysis sample.
which is under pressure due to an aging population. Second, to compensate for the skilled-worker shortage. Third, to make German university graduates more competitive on the international labor market by reducing their comparatively high age at graduation from university. The G8 reform consists of two parts. The first part is a reduction of the calendar time before leaving the academic high school with the general university entrance qualification, the Abitur, from 13 to 12 years, making students one year younger at school graduation. 5 The second part is an increase in the weekly load of instruction hours in the remaining years, as the total number of instruction hours required for graduation was left unchanged. 6 On average, the required number of weekly instruction hours at academic high schools increased from 29.4 to 33.1 hours per week (or 12.5%) and resulted in an increase in weekly workload.
7 This second part was meant to compensate for the loss in instruction hours due to the omitted 13th grade. Therefore, the G8 reform can be seen as a redistribution of instruction hours from the last grade to the previous grades. Due to the additional weekly instruction hours after the reform's implementation, each grade covered some material that was previously taught in higher grades.
Generally, the reform was implemented at the beginning of academic high school; that is, students were affected by the reform from the start of Grade 5.
8 During the transition phase a school's student body consisted of both G8 and G9 students, with schools accommodating timetables for both regimes. However, at a given point in time, in each grade there were either only G8 or only G9 students. Note that by construction of the reform, the first G8 cohort and the very last cohort under the G9 regime graduated in the same year. This graduation cohort is referred to as the double graduation cohort. Figure 1 provides an overview of the timing of the G8 reform and shows that the first exclusive G8 cohorts graduated in different points in time in different states. The figure also shows that two states always had G8, while two other states did not switch to G8 during our observation period. Our empirical strategy exploits this regional and temporal variation.
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III. Data
A. The German Student Register
Our empirical analysis is based on administrative data from the German Student Register (Studentenstatistik) that covers all students enrolled in any German university 5. The reform derives its name G8 from the fact that-after usually four years of joint primary schoolinggraduation now requires eight years of schooling at an academic high school instead of nine. Note that three states offer six years of joint primary schooling. Although the term G8 is not accurate for these states, the term G8 is widely used within Germany. Therefore, we stick to this term and use the term G9 to refer to the previous regime. 6. Unless explicitly stated, graduation refers to graduation from academic high school. 7. Note that in Germany, each federal state enacts school track-specific timetables specifying how weekly instruction hours should be distributed across different school subjects. These regulations are binding for schools. Hence, schools are not allowed to decide how to spend the extra hours. 8. In two states (Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern) students in the first G8 cohort were informed about the shortening of their school duration when they were already in Grade 9. 9. Some states have already decided to switch back to the G9 regime or leave the decision on track length to individual schools. However, these changes are outside of our observation period; see Huebener and Marcus (2015) for more details.
between 2002 (RDC 2014 . 10 Each university in Germany is obligated to provide the Federal Statistical Office with information on each individual student. The data set contains individual level information, but, due to tight data protection regulations, information on individual students cannot be linked over time. In addition to information on the year of first-time enrollment, choice of study program and institution, the data also contain information on when and in which state the student graduated from high school. This is the crucial information for determining treatment status. It is further registered which type of university entrance qualification the student has earned and whether it was earned at an academic high school. Given this information, we can identify students who were affected by the reform and those who were not. As is common for administrative data in Germany, background information is limited to gender, nationality, and date of birth.
This data set comes with at least three main benefits. First, as it is a full population census, the sample size is large, allowing for precise estimates of the reform effects. Second, as it is administrative data, panel attrition, nonrepresentativeness, and item nonresponse are of little concern. Third, data quality can be regarded as high because each institution is obligated to record the information by law. Despite these advantages, the data set is not frequently used at the individual level, with Görlitz and Gravert (2018) and Horstschräer and Sprietsma (2015) being the exceptions.
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In our analysis, we exclude all students who earned their university entrance qualification in Hesse because this state gradually implemented the G8 reform over a period of three years. Thus, we are unable to distinguish treated from untreated students. Furthermore, we keep only students who earned their general university entrance qualification from an academic high school, as the reform only affected this track. Alternative types of university entrance qualifications can be earned from other schools that were not affected by the G8 reform. In order to mitigate concerns about potential selection issues, we show in Section VI that the reform did not change the number of graduates from academic high schools. In addition, there is no evidence for changes in the composition of students in academic high schools . We discuss potential selection issues in more detail in Section VI.
B. Outcomes
In the following, we describe how we construct our three main outcome variables: enrollment rate, speed of enrollment, and study progress. For robustness purposes, we also work with alternative measures of our outcome variables. Generally, we use the individual level information and aggregate it at the state-cohort level as our treatment also varies at this level. Note that performing the analysis at the aggregate level yields the same results as performing the analysis at the individual level, if no individual control 10. There are several types of higher education institutions in Germany: public universities, private universities, universities of applied sciences, as well as colleges specializing in theology, music, art, or education. We refer to all of these institutions as "universities" unless explicitly stated otherwise. 11. The main reason for the sparse use of the data at the individual level is that it can only be accessed at specific research data centers of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder. Hübner (2012) and Bruckmeier and Wigger (2014) use an aggregated version of the German Student Register that is publicly available and provided by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2016). variables are included and the aggregate level analysis is appropriately weighted (Angrist and Pischke 2009, p. 235) . Furthermore, note that the construction of our outcome variables requires individual-level data, as the aggregated data provided by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2016) do not include the relevant information to determine treatment status and construct our outcomes.
Enrollment rate
A frequently stated policy goal in Germany, as well as in many other countries, is to increase the number of university students (OECD 2014) . The share of university educated individuals is often seen as a driver of economic growth (see, for example, Moretti 2004 ) and associated with a range of nonmonetary returns, like improved health (see, for example, Lochner 2011) and participation in democratic activities (see, for example, Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shleifer 2007) . Not surprisingly, a large number of studies investigate enrollment behavior. Each analysis of cohort enrollment rates must cope with right-censored data, as not all students make their enrollment decisions immediately after high school graduation. In particular, until July 2011, males in Germany were obligated to complete military or civilian service, which most completed prior to entering postsecondary education. Additionally, some high school graduates take a gap year before enrolling in university in order to stay abroad, do an internship or voluntary service, or just enjoy some free time. Further, some high school students complete a vocational degree before enrolling in university. Many studies focus on immediate enrollment after high school graduation (Hübner 2012; Bruckmeier and Wigger 2014; Meyer and Thomsen 2016) , neglecting that a substantial share of students enroll a year later. We extend this time window and focus on enrollment within one year, that is, on individuals who enroll in the year of high school graduation or the year after. We thereby capture the majority of students who eventually enroll in university (see also  Table 1 ). Additionally, we will further alter this time window and examine enrollment rates up to three years after high school graduation.
In order to analyze general enrollment rates, we combine the individual level data set on all students enrolled in university with annual information on the number of graduates from academic high schools in each state (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2015) . From these two sources, we calculate aggregate enrollment rates for each state and graduation cohort. More specifically, the enrollment rate is given by the share of freshmen students who enrolled in university within one year of graduating from an academic high school.
(1) Enrollment rate sc = ENR
where ENR sc refers to the number of freshman students who graduated in state s and graduation cohort c and enrolled in university in the year of high school graduation (t) or the year after (t + 1). Note that this measure is not affected by students' decisions to move to a different state in order to pursue university education, as the crucial information for our measure is the state of high school graduation and not the state in which students enroll in university. GRAD sc denotes the respective number of graduates from academic high schools.
Timing of enrollment
A main goal of the G8 reform is to allow earlier labor market entries. The effectiveness of the reform in achieving this goal will be mitigated if the reform induces students to delay their enrollment. Hence, we analyze the timing of enrollment as our second main outcome. We construct a measure for the timing of enrollment (speed of enrollment) by dividing the number of students who enroll in the year of high school graduation by the number of students enrolling within one year after high school graduation, that is, in the same year or the year after high school graduation.
(2) Speed of enrollment sc = ENR t sc
This measure indicates how many students delay their enrollment decision and allows us to disentangle changes in the timing of enrollment from general enrollment decisions. Students typically graduate from high school in June, such that enrollment in the same year means starting university in October, that is, in the following winter term.
Study progress
Similar to speed of enrollment, the outcome study progress relates to the reform's main goal in achieving an earlier labor market entry. Students not making regular study progress are unlikely to finish their university studies in the regular time. Unfortunately, our data do not include an individual panel identifier that would allow for following The three main outcome variables. For all enrollment outcomes (see the first four lines) N refers to the number of graduates from academic high schools, while for the other variables N refers to university students, that is, graduates from academic high schools who enrolled in university in the year of graduation or the year after. Further, for each graduation cohort, the time span after graduation that we can observe differs.
individuals over time. However, we can obtain a measure of study progress at the cohort level by exploiting the following particularity of the German higher education system: For administrative purposes, at the beginning of each winter term, the German higher education system not only counts the number of semesters students are enrolled in university (Hochschulsemester, semester at university), but also the number of semesters students are enrolled in the same major (Fachsemester, semester in same major). For students with regular study progress, these two numbers do not differ. We focus on students' study progress within the first year and calculate the share of students with regular study progress out of all students who enrolled within one year after graduating from an academic high school.
where REG refers to the number of students with regular study progress one year after enrollment, that is, students for whom the number of university semesters equals the number of semesters enrolled in the same major at the beginning of the third semester. Similar to speed of enrollment the outcome study progress is only defined for students who enroll in university. Hence, both have a conditional-on-positives interpretation.
There are three main reasons for a nonregular study progress. First, students can drop out of university. Second, students can change their major.
13 Third, students can formally request a temporary interruption of their university studies (Urlaubssemester). In this case the number of interruption semesters is only added to the number of university semesters, while it does not increase the number of semesters in the same major. Among others, reasons for such temporary interruptions include maternity leaves, long-term illnesses, care responsibilities, and studying abroad, although the last is not very common within the first year of studies. We also decompose study progress and differentiate between dropping out, changing major, and temporary interruption. 14 C. Descriptive Statistics Table 1 displays summary statistics related to our outcome variables. In our sample, 47 percent of high school graduates enroll in university in the same year they graduate from high school. One year later, three-quarters of the graduation cohort are enrolled, while this share increases only marginally to 82 percent two years after graduation and to 86 percent three years after. These numbers indicate that the majority of a cohort enrolls in university in the year of graduation or the year after, that is, within the first year after high school graduation. After this, only a small share of graduates enroll. Thus, our main 12. Note that the relevant information on study progress during the first year originates from the beginning of the third semester. Our data set covers the full student population only in winter terms. Hence, unlike the other two outcomes, study progress is based on students who started university in the winter term; students who started in summer term are not included in this measure. 13. Unlike in the United States, students in Germany must choose a major when they enroll in university. Changing one's major usually results in an increased duration of study. 14. Note that students switching university are not counted as dropouts in our measure. However, for students who drop out, it might be possible that they enroll again after a break. These students are still counted as dropouts in our measure. Further note that changing major not only captures changing major at the same university but also includes changing major combined with switching to another university in Germany.
analysis focuses on students who enroll in university within one year after high school graduation. Table 1 further shows that 61 percent of students who enrolled within one year did so in the year of graduation; this is our main measure for the timing of enrollment. Among students who enrolled within one year, 7 percent completely drop out of university within the first year of study, while 11 percent change their major, and 1 percent take a formal interruption; the remaining 81 percent of students show regular study progress.
Note that due to the different timing of the reform implementation, the number of states already affected by the reform varies depending on the outcome under consideration. In the sample of our main analysis, we try to include as many observations as possible in order to fully exploit all available information. Therefore, sample sizes differ between the outcomes. Our conclusions, however, do not change when we apply more restrictive sample selection criteria (see Section VI).
IV. Estimation Strategy
In order to estimate the effect of the G8 reform on (i) the enrollment rate, (ii) the speed of enrollment, and (iii) study progress, we apply a difference-indifferences strategy of the following form:
where y sc refers to one of the outcomes for graduation cohort c in state s, and s denotes the individual's state of high school graduation and not the state of the university enrollment. b 1 depicts the effect of the G8 reform and is the coefficient of interest. k s is a set of state fixed effects that captures general differences between states (like time constant differences in states' education systems). A set of time fixed effects (m c ) takes into account general time trends in the outcomes. This is an essential element of our identification strategy, as, for instance, the share of specific birth cohorts entering higher education is steadily increasing over time in Germany. Further, the time fixed effects also capture shocks that are common to all states, like the suspension of military service in 2011 (which is particularly relevant for speed of enrollment). The equation further includes an indicator variable, DC sc , for the double graduation cohort; we thereby assign the double cohort neither to the treatment nor to the control group for two main reasons. First, the data only contain information on the year and state of high school graduation, not the individual G8 status. Thus, we cannot exactly determine treatment status for individuals in the double cohort. Second, students from the double graduation cohort may be affected rather differently by the reform due to the larger cohort size (Bound and Turner 2007; Morin 2015a,b) . We further augment this baseline model by adding a binary variable for the last cohort before the double cohort (lastG9 sc ), which is the last exclusive G9 cohort. This is important because students in this cohort had a particularly strong incentive for speedy enrollment in order to avoid beginning to study with the double cohort. Hence, the G8 reform might have spillover effects on the graduation cohort directly preceding the double cohort. Finally, e sc is the error term. As the error term is likely to be correlated within states, we follow the recommendation of Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) and cluster the standard errors at the level of the policy change. 15 Note that all our aggregate-level regressions are weighted so that our results exactly equal individual level regressions (Angrist and Pischke 2009, p. 235 ).
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V. Results
A. Graphical Evidence
Before presenting our main estimation results, we provide graphical evidence on the validity of the difference-in-differences design. The key identifying assumption for a causal interpretation of our results is the existence of parallel outcome trends in G8 and G9 states in the absence of the G8 reform. As the reform was implemented at different points in time, for the graphical representation we organize states in event time, that is, relative to the reform introduction (t = 0), which is the year the double cohort graduated. We examine whether the trends in outcomes differed between treatment and control states before the reform implementation.
17
The event study graphs in Figure 2 provide support for the common trend assumption as there are basically no differential pretreatment trends between treatment and control states. While for all three outcomes there is hardly any difference between treatment and control states four, three, and two years before the reform implementation, there is some evidence for anticipation effects one year before the reform implementation in the second panel. Graduates of this last exclusive G9 cohort strongly responded to the incentive to enroll in the year of their graduation in order to avoid starting with the double graduation cohort (which is eligible to enter university one year after the last G9 cohort). Thus, in order to obtain unbiased estimates of the reform effects, it is necessary to take these anticipation effects into account and control for the last exclusive G9. Additionally, enrollment rates for students in the last G9 cohort appear slightly lower. One reason for this might be that students in this cohort who do not enroll immediately after high school graduation and do not want to start studying with the double graduation cohort in the following year refrain from enrolling altogether.
Apart from the last exclusive G9 cohort, the double graduation cohort is a peculiar cohort that deserves further attention. The double graduation cohort consists of both G8 and G9 students, which we cannot distinguish between in our data. For students in this cohort, speed of enrollment and study progress are lower than in the control group, but the negative effects are clearly less pronounced. In contrast, the reduction in enrollment rates in the double graduation cohort appears even larger. The observations for 15. This is more conservative than clustering the standard errors at the state-year level in our case. Additionally, we apply wild cluster bootstrapping in Section VI, which is recommended for situations with few clusters (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2008; Cameron and Miller 2015) . 16. For each outcome, the weights are given by the outcome's denominator; that is, enrollment rates are weighted with the number of graduates and the other two outcomes with the number of freshmen students who enrolled in the year of graduation or the year after. Our results are very similar if we perform the analysis without weights (see Section VI). 17. Figure 2 is based on a version of Equation 4, in which we substitute the single G8 indicator by a set of leads and lags of the reform indicator that capture the reform's effect for cohorts four, three, two, and one year before, as well as one, two, three, and four or more years after the reform implementation. General differences over time and between states are taken into account by state and graduation cohort fixed effects. For the estimated coefficients depicted in Figure 2 , see Table A .1 in the Online Appendix (available at http://jhr.uwpress.org).
Figure 2 Leads and Lags of the Reform Effects
Notes: This figure displays the development of the outcome variables around the reform introduction. It is based on estimates of a version of Equation 4, in which we substitute the single G8 indicator by a set of leads and lags of the reform indicator that capture the reform's effect for cohorts four, three, two, and one year before as well as one, two, three, and four or more years after the reform implementation. General differences over time and between states are taken into account by state and graduation cohort fixed effects. "DC" refers to the double graduation cohort, which comprises the first G8 cohort and the very last cohort under the G9 regime, who graduated in the same year. The displayed 95 percent confidence intervals are based on standard errors clustered at the state level.
the double graduation cohort and the last exclusive G9 cohort are in line with the argument that wages are lower in larger cohorts (Welch 1979) and that rational students will take this into account in their enrollment decision (Bound and Turner 2007) .
Overall, the graphical evidence presented in Figure 2 supports the assumption of parallel pretreatment trends in our outcome variables between treatment and control states and provides evidence for a sharp change with the introduction of the G8 reform: enrollment rate, speed of enrollment, and the share of students with a regular study progress are all clearly lower after the reform introduction in treatment states compared to control states. Table 2 presents the main estimation results. While Column 1 shows the results for the baseline difference-in-differences specification, which controls for state and time fixed effects as well as for the double graduation cohort, Column 2-our preferred specification-further controls for the last G9 cohort. The results in Panel A, Column 1, indicate that the enrollment rate declined by 5.1 pp due to the G8 reform. Controlling for the last cohort before the double graduation cohort (Column 2) slightly increases this effect in absolute terms to 6 pp. The estimated reform effect amounts to a 7.3 percent decline in enrollment. 18 The decline in the enrollment rate of 6 pp is quite large compared to other findings in the literature. For example, for the much debated introduction of tuition fees in Germany of EUR 500 per term, Hübner (2012) identifies a decrease in enrollment by 2.7 pp. Other studies even find smaller or insignificant reductions in enrollment rates (Helbig, Baier, and Kroth 2012; Bruckmeier and Wigger 2014) . Comparing our result to findings for financial aid in Germany, Steiner and Wrohlich (2012) estimate that an annual increase in financial aid by EUR 1,000 increases enrollment rates by 2 pp. Estimated effect sizes of financial aid are similar for Denmark (Nielsen, Sørensen, and Taber 2010) and slightly larger for the United States (see, for example, Dynarski 2002; Abraham and Clark 2006) . Compared to these effect sizes, our estimate suggests that the negative G8 reform effect on enrollment is substantial. 19 Further, we find that the timing of enrollment changes as a consequence of the reform (Panel B). Among those who enroll in the year of graduation or the year after, the probability of enrolling immediately decreases by 6.8 pp (Column 2), indicating that a nontrivial fraction of students delay their enrollment. The estimation results presented in Panel C show that the probability of regular study progress also decreases significantly. The share of students with regular study progress during the first year of studies decreases by 2.6 pp. Table 2 also reports the coefficients for the double graduation cohort and the last exclusive G9 cohort, confirming the observations in Figure 2 . As we are unable to 18. The percentage change is calculated based on the counterfactual mean: % change =b
B. Main Results
19. Given this comparably large effect on enrollment rates, it might be surprising at first that this effect was not noticed by the general public. However, the general public tends to make before-and-after comparisons and does not think in counterfactual or difference-in-differences settings, respectively. Thus, the negative reform effect is likely to be masked by the positive time trend in enrollment rates in Germany. In addition, the federal states implemented the reform at different points in time, and not all students enroll immediately after high school graduation (and not necessarily in the state they graduated from academic high school). This makes it more difficult to note any reform-induced decreases in enrollment rates. distinguish between the cohort's G8 and G9 students, the coefficient for the double cohort displays the joint effect for both G8 and G9 students within that cohort. 20 For students in the double graduation cohort, the probability to enroll within one year after graduation, that is, in the year of graduation or the year after, is reduced by more than 8 pp. The effect for this cohort is significantly larger than the G8 effect and underlines that the double cohort is peculiar and findings for this cohort do not necessarily reflect the experiences of later G8 cohorts. For students in the last G9 cohort, the probability to enroll in university within one year after graduation decreases by about 1.6 pp. Moreover, the probability to enroll immediately after graduation increases by 6.9 pp for this cohort. This further strengthens the argument that graduates take into account the cohort size in their decision to enroll in university.
Taken together, the results of this section suggest that fewer graduates enroll in university as a consequence of the G8 reform. On top of that, the reform's success in reducing the age of labor market entry may be mitigated. More students delay their enrollment, and fewer students show regular study progress.
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C. Outcome-Specific Supplementary Results
In this section, we provide further evidence on the reform's effects. These results complement our main analysis as presented in the previous section.
Enrollment rates
The previous section focuses on enrollment within one year after high school graduation, as the majority of students who enroll in university do so within this time frame (see Table 1 ). However, from a human capital accumulation perspective, it is important to analyze whether students refrain from enrolling entirely or just delay their enrollment beyond the first year. Thus, we redefine the numerator of Equation 1 and study the G8 effect on enrollment rates within two and three years after graduation. For completeness, and in order to compare our estimates with existing evidence on enrollment rates, we also report the effect on enrollment rates in the year of graduation. Table 3 shows that the reform's effect is most pronounced for enrollment in the same year, which decreases by 8 pp (Column 1). This is not a surprise, given the evidence that students delay their enrollment. This is the only effect that we can directly compare to estimates in Meyer, Thomsen, and Schneider (2015) , as they only observe students in the year of their graduation. Relying on survey data, the authors find an even higher decrease in enrollment in the same year, which at around 15 pp is almost twice as large as our effect. The strong difference in estimated effect sizes emphasize the importance of accounting for the 20. In Table A .2 in the Online Appendix, we approximate the treatment status for individuals in the double cohorts based on information on students' birthday and school entry regulations. Due to grade retention, this is an imperfect approximation and, therefore, not our preferred specification. Nevertheless, within the double cohort, G8 students are also less likely to enroll in university and more likely to delay their enrollment than G9 students. However, we find enrollment rates to decrease also for G9 students in this cohort. The negative effect for the double cohort with respect to study progress even seems to be driven by G9 students. 21. We also examined whether the reform affected students' college major choice or their choice on the type of higher education institutions. This might additionally give us an indication about whether lower performing students in particular are affected by the reform. Our results (not shown) indicate that these outcomes are not affected. specific incentives of the last G9 cohort, which is included in the control group in the analysis of Meyer, Thomsen, and Schneider (2015) .
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The effect on enrollment within two years after graduation (Column 2) is as large as the effect on enrollment within one year after graduation. Similarly, the effect on enrollment within three years after graduation (Column 3) is only marginally smaller in absolute terms. Note that enrollment within three years after high school graduation provides students starting a vocational education directly after high school graduation enough time to complete this degree (earning a vocational degree usually takes two to three years) and enroll in university afterwards. However, even considering these later enrollment decisions, three years after graduation still fewer students enroll in university in response to the G8 reform, providing no evidence for a quick catch-up of enrollment. Due to the relative newness of the reform and the consequential right-censoring, we cannot observe a cohort's lifetime enrollment rate (individuals could theoretically also enroll at the age of 25 or 80). However, it seems questionable whether lifetime enrollment for G8 students will catch up with those of G9 students as the effect size is still substantial when considering enrollments within three years after graduation (about 4.3 pp); in addition, few graduates enroll in university more than three years after graduation.
Timing of enrollment
Our measure for the timing of enrollment, as defined in Equation 2, involves some degree of arbitrariness with respect to the student population that we look at Notes: This table presents the effect of the G8 reform for additional enrollment outcomes. All estimates are based on our main specification as outlined in Equation 4. In line with controlling for the last G9 cohort in Column 1 and 2, in Column 3 we additionally control for the cohorts two years and in Column 4 three years before the double cohort in order to consider the disincentive for these cohorts to enroll together with the double cohort. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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. We obtain similar effects as reported in Meyer, Thomsen, and Schneider (2015) when replicating their main specification (that is, assigning the last G9 cohort to the control group and implementing a two-period difference-in-differences specification). However, when we remove this last G9 cohort from the control group, the estimated effect is close to our estimate of 8 pp.
(denominator), as well as the time frame of enrollment (numerator). Hence, Table 4 shows the effect of the reform if we use alternative definitions of speed of enrollment. First, we only change the denominator and look at students who enroll within two and three years after graduation (instead of within one year, as in our main definition). Extending the time period between high school graduation and university enrollment does not change our conclusion: The G8 reform significantly decreases the probability to enroll in the year of graduation (Panel A). Second, we additionally alter the numerator of our outcome measure and look at enrollment within one year (instead of immediate enrollment, as in our main definition). Panel B in Table 4 shows that the timing of enrollment changes also at other margins. Among those who enroll within two years after graduation, the probability of enrolling within one year after graduation is significantly lowered by the reform. Thus, using alternative definitions, we substantiate our finding that the G8 reform induces students to delay their enrollment and show that students who delay their enrollment mostly do so by one year. . The upper left coefficient, for instance, refers to the effect of the G8 reform on the timing of enrollment, measured as the share of students who enroll in the year of graduation among all students who enroll within one year after graduation. Similarly, the lower right coefficient refers to the share of students who enroll within one year among all those who enroll within three years after graduation. All estimates are based on our main specification as outlined in Equation 4. In line with controlling for the last G9 cohort in Column 1, in Column 2 we additionally control for the cohorts two years and in Column 3 three years before the double cohort in order to consider the disincentive for these cohorts to enroll together with the double cohort. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Study progress
The decrease in regular study progress found in the previous section can be either explained by students dropping out of university, by students changing their major, or by students formally requesting a temporary interruption of their studies. In order to separate these three reasons, we generate three new outcome variables analogously to Equation 3. Similar to the main definition of study progress, these three outcomes refer to all students who enrolled within one year after graduation. Table 5 shows that the probability to drop out of university increases by about 1 pp (Column 1). While this effect may appear rather small, it corresponds to an increase of 14 percent. We also find evidence that the reform increases the likelihood of students changing their major by 1.6 pp (or 15%). The effect on study interruptions is negligible and insignificant. These results suggest that affected students are less certain about their choices and consequently more likely to adjust their decisions than students unaffected by the reform. Table 5 also shows that the decrease in regular study progress is mainly driven by an increased probability of students changing their major. This effect accounts for about 62 percent of the overall decrease in regular progress, while 37 percent can be attributed to an increase in dropout rates.
VI. Robustness
This section conducts robustness checks, supporting a causal interpretation of our results, and explores the sensitivity of the results to different model specifications. A summary of the sensitivity analysis is presented in Table 6 , where the first column shows the estimates of our main specification as reference points.
The key identifying assumption for a causal interpretation of our results is the existence of parallel outcome trends in G8 and G9 states in the absence of the G8 reform. Figure 2 already provides graphical evidence in support of this assumption. However, the common trend assumption would also be violated if the timing of the reform implementation was correlated with other factors that are related to the outcomes we investigate. States that implemented the reform early, thus contributing relatively more to our findings, may have been on different trajectories regarding our outcomes than those states implementing the reform later or those states that did not experience any changes. Note that the reform was generally implemented when students entered Grade 5 of academic high school. Thus, many years lie between the reform start and the time when our outcome variables are measured, making it unlikely that the timing of the reform is driven by policymakers targeting immediate changes in our outcome variable. Further, when researching states' decisions on when to implement the reform, we found no evidence that these decisions are related to the outcomes we investigate. SaxonyAnhalt and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, two eastern German states, were the first to implement the reform. They were already familiar with G8 as they had a G8 system in the 1990s and before reunification. Saarland, the third to implement the reform, is a rather small state on the French border with close links to France. Here, policymakers were eager to implement the G8 reform quickly as they saw their graduates at a disadvantage compared to the French graduates, who graduated one year earlier. While 2012 is the year with the most double graduation cohorts (four states), it was rational for the most populous state, North Rhine-Westphalia, to have its double graduation cohort one year later. In order to refute any related concerns, in Table 6 we relax the common trend assumption and allow for state-specific linear time trends (Column 2). All effects remain statistically significant and are of similar magnitude to those of our main specification. Cotreatments, in the form of other policy reforms, are a related threat to the parallel trends assumption. Note that policy changes implemented at the federal level and common to all states (like the suspension of military service in 2011) are already taken into account by the time fixed effects. During our observation period, German states, however, implemented another set of secondary schooling and university policies. These reforms were implemented at different points in time in different states and none of these policies are perfectly collinear to the G8 reform (for an overview of affected states and cohorts, see Table A .3 in the Online Appendix). At the secondary school level, these policy reforms include the introduction of centralized school exit examinations, changes in the timing of secondary school tracking, as well as the reduction in subject choice during the last two years of academic high school. To account for these policy changes, we include dummy variables for each of the three school policies. At the university level, we include a dummy variable for the existence of tuition fees, which were decided upon at the state level. Further, we take into account the introduction of the two-tier degree system (introduction of bachelor's and master's degrees) as part of the Bologna reforms. Because the decision when to switch to the two-tier degree system was left to the universities, and even to departments within universities, we include a continuous variable capturing the share of students enrolled in a bachelor program, as opposed to other degree programs (diploma, magister, state examination), among all freshmen students at university in the year before students' high school graduation as a proxy for the likelihood of enrolling in a bachelor program. 23 Controlling for all these school and university policies in Column 3 does not change our conclusions.
23. While it is straightforward to link the school reforms to high school graduation cohorts, the task is slightly more complicated for the university reforms because the state of high school graduation can differ from the state Another threat to our identification strategy relates to compositional changes in treatment and control states. As the G8 reform only affected academic high schools, the composition of treated and untreated students might change as students try to evade the reform. This could happen in several ways. First, students could move to a different state that has not yet implemented the reform. Second, academic high school students might switch to a lower secondary school track that is unaffected by the G8 reform. Third, students might switch to alternative school types where the university entrance qualification is still earned after 13 years. In all three cases, fewer individuals would graduate from academic high schools. Using full population data, we do not find an effect of the reform on the number of graduates from academic high schools (see Table A .4 in the Online Appendix). This result confirms the finding of for an extended time window. Further, Dahmann and Anger (2014) do not find evidence for increased mobility of academic high school students between states, and Huebener, Marcus, and Kuger (2017) show that, based on observable student characteristics, the reform does not change the composition of students. Moving to a different state and/or switching to a different school type in order to avoid the reform might be easiest in the city states of Berlin, Bremen, and Hamburg due to the regional proximity of other states and the availability of further schools types. Column 4 in Table 6 shows that our results do not change when we exclude these three states.
As pointed out by several other studies, economic conditions cannot only influence enrollment decisions but also students' decision to stay in education and continue their studies (for example, Betts and McFarland 1995; Bedard and Herman 2008; Sievertsen 2016) . Thus, in Column 5 we control for GDP growth, unemployment rate, and youth unemployment in the state and year of students' high school graduation. All our estimates are robust to controlling for the states' economic conditions. Similarly, as argued by Bound and Turner (2007) and Bruckmeier and Wigger (2014) , cohort size, specifically, the number of students earning a university entrance qualification, may affect students' enrollment decisions. It may further affect study progress if students are unwilling to continue their studies in crowded lectures and study classes. Therefore, in Column 6 of Table 6 we control for the log of the number of high school graduates from all school types in each state and year; again, our estimates remain unchanged.
There are several specific details of the reform's implementation that could potentially affect our estimates. First, a double graduation cohort in one state might influence students' enrollment decisions in neighboring states. In Column 7 we consider these potential spillover effects by additionally controlling for the existence of double graduation cohorts in neighboring states. Second, in general, students in the first G8 cohort knew that they would graduate after eight instead of nine years when they entered academic high school. However, in Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, students in the first G8 cohort were only informed about the shortening of the school duration when they were in Grade 9. Thus, this and the following two cohorts were of university enrollment. In addition, students can enroll in university in different years after graduation. We decided to link the graduation cohorts with the status of university policies in the state of high school graduation, as the majority of students enroll in universities in the state of high school graduation (about 65%). With respect to the time dimension, for tuition fees we chose the current situation at universities, that is, the status of these policies in the year of students' high school graduation, while for the introduction of the two-tier degree system we rely on the situation in the year before high school graduation.
surprised by the G8 reform and exposed to an even higher increase in weekly workload, which makes these cohorts quite distinct. In Column 8 of Table 6 we control for the two cohorts after the double graduation cohort in Saxony-Anhalt and MecklenburgVorpommern in order to rule out that our effects are driven by these cohorts. Third, there are four states that did not experience any change in the length of schooling during our observation period (see Figure 1) . We exclude these four states from our estimation sample to examine if these results depend on specific trends in states that did not change treatment status (see Column 9). None of these alternative model specifications change our estimates significantly.
The last three columns of Table 6 address various specification issues. Column 10 shows that our results for the first two outcomes are insensitive to using the same cohorts as for the last outcome. As there is a discussion about the appropriateness of weighting in difference-in-differences settings, we also estimate a specification without weighting (see Column 11). Furthermore, Column 12 shows that our conclusions do not change when applying wild-cluster bootstrapping (1,000 replications, Mammen weights, testing under H 0 ) as an alternative method of inference.
Overall, the results of our robustness analysis as presented in Table 6 support a causal interpretation of our effects.
VII. Heterogeneity of the Treatment Effect
All results described in the previous sections represent average treatment effects. To investigate whether these average effects mask relevant differences, this section examines treatment effect heterogeneity across cohorts, genders, and federal states.
A. Heterogeneity across Cohorts
It is important for researchers and policymakers alike to analyze whether the estimated reform effects are only temporary or lasting reform effects. As the reform is relatively new, we cannot look at a long posttreatment horizon. Nevertheless, we can examine the size of the treatment effect for several cohorts after the reform implementation. 24 Figure 2 shows that there is no clear pattern of the treatment effect on enrollment rates over subsequent cohorts (see also Table A.1 in the Online Appendix). The effect for the first cohort after the implementation is of similar magnitude as the overall effect. The effect for the second cohort after the implementation is larger, while the effect for the third cohort is smaller. However, the effect for cohorts four or more years after the double graduation cohort is similar to the effect after one year. Thus, there is little evidence that the reform's effect on enrollment rate fades over time. This suggests that the decreased enrollment rate is not just a temporary shock resulting from the fact that the involved parties (for example, teachers, students, and parents) are not used to the new system. The development of the treatment effect appears to be different for speed of enrollment. Here, each coefficient is smaller in absolute terms than the coefficient for the previous cohort, indicating that the size of the reform's effect is declining over time. One explanation for this declining effect size is that students of the first G8 cohorts are more aware of their age advantage since they are closer to the last G9 cohorts and, hence, more likely to compare themselves with these older students. With respect to study progress there is some evidence for an increase in the reform's effect over time as the coefficients increase almost monotonously across cohorts (in absolute terms). Again, this indicates that the reform effect is not only temporary in nature, but also that several cohorts after the reform implementation the share of students with a regular study progress is lower.
Overall, Figure 2 suggests that while the effect on the timing of enrollment may fade over a longer time period, the effects on enrollment rate and study progress seem to persist. 
B. Heterogeneity by Gender
Previous research on the G8 reform finds evidence of gender-specific differences in the reform effects (see, for example, Büttner and Thomsen 2013; Dahmann and Anger 2014; Meyer and Thomsen 2016; . In light of this evidence, we examine treatment effect heterogeneity by gender in Table 7 . We can neither establish differential reform effects for enrollment rates nor for the speed of enrollment. Our estimates do not confirm the finding for the double cohort in Saxony-Anhalt suggesting that only females delay their enrollment (Meyer and Thomsen 2016) . One reason for this difference is that Meyer and Thomsen (2016) look exclusively at the double cohort. This explanation is supported by findings of Morin (2015b) , who shows that females react more negatively to increased competition resulting from a larger cohort size. This again highlights the importance of examining cohorts other than the double cohort when evaluating the overall consequences of the G8 reform. For study progress the point estimate for males is higher (in absolute terms) than for females, although these two estimates do not differ significantly. Generally, the results do not suggest that males and females are affected differently by the G8 reform.
C. Heterogeneity across States
In this subsection we differentiate the treatment effect by federal state in order to determine whether specific states managed to implement the reform without negative consequences. For this purpose, we substitute the binary treatment indicator in Equation 4 with interactions between the treatment indicator and each treatment state. Panel B of Table 7 shows that the overall G8 effects are not driven by individual states. For enrollment rate, the treatment effect is negative and significant in the overwhelming majority of treatment states. These significant coefficients are close to the estimated overall reform effect of about 6 pp and vary between -3 and -8 pp. There seems to be no general pattern among the coefficients, as these are similar for early and late adopters, for states in eastern and western Germany, as well as for city states and other states. A 25. Note that due to the differential timing of the reform implementation in states, a varying subset of treatment states identify the point estimates for the different posttreatment cohorts. However, using a constant set of treatment states confirms the patterns regarding the dynamics of the treatment effect. The results for enrollment rate are even more stable across cohorts. Results are provided in the working paper version (Marcus and Zambre 2016) . . In Panel A, we interact each variable in the model with a binary indicator for gender (fully interacted model). In Panel B, we substitute the G8 indicator by interaction terms between this indicator and each treatment state. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. similar picture emerges for speed of enrollment. All coefficients are negative, and nine are significantly different from zero. As for our first outcome, there is no general pattern across state characteristics. With respect to study progress, all coefficients but one are again negative and significant. 26 Also for study progress we find little evidence for substantial state differences.
Taken together, this section finds little evidence for differential treatment effects across time, states, or genders. This underlines the general nature of our results. Regarding the external validity of our findings, it is likely that the G8 reform will have similar consequences in the states implementing the reform outside of our sample period.
VIII. Channels
This section explores various mechanisms that may explain our results. We first discuss arguments concerning the supply of university slots before we turn to demand-side arguments. In order to examine the potential channels, we do not just use data from the German Student Register, but in addition draw on data from the German Rectors' Conference (2014) (Hochschulrektorenkonferenz) and the German SocioEconomic Panel (SOEP).
A. Supply-Side Channels
One mechanism that could explain the decrease in enrollment rates are supply-side restrictions, that is, a shortage of university slots. However, this would mainly apply to students in the double graduation cohort, which is roughly double in size and which we excluded from the treatment group. Nevertheless, if universities are unable to provide sufficient places for the double graduation cohort, this might have spillover effects on the enrollment decision of subsequent G8 cohorts. If resources were not adequately increased, subsequent G8 students may face more difficulties in being admitted to university since students from the double cohort still queue to gain access to universities. A decrease in enrollment rates may only mirror higher competition for study places instead of students' actual choices. However, several arguments suggest that supply-side restrictions are not the key mechanism explaining our results: First, to cover the demand shock induced by the double graduation cohort, the governments of the treated states and the federal government continuously increased university funding under the Higher Education Pact (Hochschulpakt). In part, this funding was explicitly directed toward increasing university slots to accommodate the double graduation cohort. Second, if there was a shortage of university slots, universities would have to tighten their admission policies. Consequently, the share of (locally) restricted study programs should increase, that is, programs that use a cut-off based on the final high school grade points average to select students for admission (numerus clausus).
27 However, Table 8 shows 26. Due to the nature of this outcome variable, we have to rely on fewer graduation cohorts (see also Table 1 ). Therefore, we cannot display coefficients for states that implemented the G8 reform in 2012 or later. 27. Unlike in other countries, admission is only centrally restricted for a few programs. Generally, universities only set local admission restrictions if the number of applications exceeds available slots. This implies that cutoffs are determined retrospectively. ). Estimation is based on data from the German Rectors' Conference (2014) for the first two rows, on SOEP survey data (SOEP.v32.1) for Rows 4, 9, 10, 11, and 12, and on the German Student Register for Rows 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. that the reform does not significantly increase the share of restricted study programs, irrespective of whether we only look at bachelor's programs (Row 1) or also at other first degree programs, like state examinations (Row 2).
28 Hence, there is no evidence that students affected by the reform faced higher competition with respect to being admitted to university. Third, if supply-side restrictions drive the results, we should see students circumventing these restrictions by studying in a different state. Yet, our estimates in Row 3 of Table 8 do not suggest a decline in the share of students who study in their home state; if anything, we find G8 students to be slightly more likely to enroll in their home state. For these reasons, we conclude that supply-side restrictions are unlikely to be the main explanation for the decrease in enrollment rates. In addition, drawing on the SOEP survey data, 29 we also show that the reform does not reduce students' perceived probability of getting a slot in their preferred study program (see Row 4). Thus, there is also no evidence that anticipated supply-side restrictions affect students' enrollment behavior.
B. Demand-Side Channels
We now turn to demand-side arguments. The G8 reform can be thought of as consisting of two parts: (i) the reduction of the length of academic high school, which makes students one year younger at graduation (age channel), and (ii) the compensating increase in instruction hours in the remaining years, which resulted in a higher weekly workload (workload channel). Recall that while the age channel includes less time for orientation and the younger age at graduation, the workload channel comprises decreased performance at school, higher levels of stress, and lower motivation for further learning.
It is difficult to determine whether our findings are driven by the age channel or by the workload channel because there is little independent variation between the two channels. Nevertheless, in the following we provide some suggestive evidence. We proceed by first estimating the reform's effect on students' age at university enrollment. Then we examine whether the reform effects persist when we try to keep students' age constant. In this specification, if the G8 effect is close to zero and insignificant, our findings can be attributed mostly to the age channel. If, on the other hand, we also find a significant effect of the G8 reform on students who are of similar age, this provides some evidence 28. For these specifications, we estimate models in the style of Equation 4, in which we use the share of all restricted bachelor's programs and the share of all restricted first degree programs, respectively, as outcome. Information on the share of locally restricted study programs as well as on the share of all first degree programs is only available from 2006 onwards and provided by the German Rectors' Conference (2014) (Hochschulrektorenkonferenz). 29. The SOEP is among the largest and longest-running household panels in the world (Wagner, Frick, and Schupp 2007) and a nationwide random sample of the German population. We make use of the SOEP's youth questionnaire, which targets individuals in the year they turn 17; that is, these interviews take place before the completion of the academic high school. We look at several outcome variables (see Table A .5 in the Online Appendix for the coding of the outcomes) and assign treatment status based on the attended school track and the day of birth. We regress each outcome on the treatment indicator and control for state and cohort fixed effects. In order to make the sample comparable to our main analysis sample, we only look at students from academic high schools of the same birth cohorts and apply survey weights. The number of observations is clearly lower in the SOEP compared to the German Student Register, leading to a lower precision of the estimates. that the age channel seems to play a minor role. Finally, using SOEP data, we look at some further measures that are related to the age and workload channel.
Focusing on students who enroll within one year after graduation, as in our main specification, Table 8 shows that the reform successfully decreased students' age at enrollment (see Row 5), although only by eight and a half months (0.73 years), compared to a potential reduction of a full year. 30 Having established the age effect of the reform, we try to hold students' age constant by looking at G8 and G9 students who graduated from academic high schools at the age of 19.
31 These students are of similar age, but experienced different amounts of weekly workload due to the reform. For all three outcome variables, holding students' age constant, the G8 reform indicator is still significant (Rows 6-8). For speed of enrollment and study progress the effect is also similar in magnitude as in our main specification, while for enrollment rate the reform's effect is even larger. These estimates suggest that the reform's effect does not mainly run through the reduced age of students but can rather be attributed to the workload channel.
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This conclusion is again supported by additional analyses using SOEP data. If the effects are driven by students' younger age at high school graduation, we would expect that students rely more strongly on parental input regarding the choice of their postsecondary educational path and that students are less sure about their future occupational choice. However, we find no evidence that the reform affected either of these outcomes (see Rows 9 and 10). In order to provide more concrete evidence on the workload channel, we turn to two indicators of students' school performance. Table 8 shows that the reform worsens students' school grades (Row 11), 33 while it increases the probability of hiring a private tutor (Row 12). This is in line with previous research showing that the G8 reform slightly reduced students' performance at the end of academic high school (Büttner and Thomsen 2013; Hübner et al. 2017) and that students feel more stressed by learning due to the reform . 30 . Our results can be compared with findings in , who show that the G8 reform reduced the age at high school graduation by 0.86 years. This highlights that the difference between our point estimates and a reduction by a full year (that is, a coefficient of "-1") results from two factors: First, already at the time of high school graduation the reform did not achieve its full potential in terms of age reduction; second, graduates delayed their enrollment, as shown in the previous sections. 31. According to the school entry regulations, posting the cut-off date for school entry at June 30th, we compare G9 students who are born between January and June with G8 students who are born between July and December. Note that for the denominator of enrollment rates (as defined in Equation 1) the information on the exact birth date is not available. Thus, we have to assume that all 19-year-old high school graduates entered school according to school entry regulations. 32. The estimations in Rows 6-8 of Table 8 may, however, be flawed by potential relative age effects. By analyzing G8 and G9 students of similar age, we compare G9 students who are relatively younger with respect to their graduation cohort with G8 students who are relatively older within their cohort. However, the literature on relative age effects in school suggests advantages for relatively older students (see, for example, Bedard and Dhuey 2006; Mühlenweg and Puhani 2010) . If relatively older students perform better, we might also expect higher enrollment rates, faster enrollment, and a higher probability of regular study progress for the relatively older G8 students (as compared to the relatively younger G9 students). As we compare older G8 students with younger G9 students, the aforementioned arguments would rather bias our estimates toward zero. Yet, the G8 effects in Table 8 are not smaller than the estimates in our main specification, suggesting that relative age effects are not a major concern for our interpretation that the age channel is less relevant. 33. For this outcome, we rely on the average of the grades in German, mathematics, and the first foreign language. Point estimates are very similar when we look at the different subjects separately.
To sum up, we find little evidence that supply-side restrictions are the main channel driving our results. We also find little support for the claim that the G8 reform primarily works through the reduced age of students. Instead, there is evidence that the obtained reform impact operates through the higher workload during school and the associated weaker school performance.
IX. Discussion
In light of the negative effects of the reform on students' higher education decisions, an interesting question is whether the benefits of the reform still exceed the negative effects presented in the previous sections. The net benefit of the reform will still be positive if the earnings gain from an extended labor market participation can offset the earnings loss of graduates who, due to the reform, do not enter university education. Thus, for a back-of-the-envelope cost-benefit consideration, we use the difference in average lifetime earnings under the G9 and the G8 regime as an indicator for the reform's net benefit. This calculation is based on a simplified framework in which the average lifetime labor earnings of an individual in a cohort under regime G˛[G8;G9] is given by:
where N u G denotes the share of academic high school graduates with a university degree; w u [w a ] is the average annual wage for individuals with [without] a university degree, and y u [y a ] describes the number of years in the labor market over the life course for individuals with [without] a university degree. 34 Our results suggest that fewer individuals enroll in university due to the reform (that is, N u G8 < N u
G9
) and that the reform will not increase the average working life by a full year but only by a fraction of a year (l):
The reform effect
) on the average lifetime earnings in a cohort can then be expressed as:
In order to examine whether d is positive, we plug in values for each parameter of Equation 7. While the values for l, N u
, and N u G8 are based on our reform estimates, for w a and w u we draw on estimates obtained from the literature. For the overall number of years in the labor market, we assume y u = 43 years and y a = 45 years, based on a stylized educational path. 35 According to administrative data from the German Employment Agency, average annual labor earnings for academic high school graduates without a university degree amount to w a = EUR 34,685 (Schmillen and Stüber 2014) . We assume 34. In Germany, almost all graduates from academic high schools either pursue a university or a vocational degree. The share of students in this group who does not continue to postsecondary education is, at 2 percent, very low (Quast, Scheller, and Lörz 2014) . 35. Individuals leave academic high school at age 19 and retire at age 67; obtaining a university degree takes five years, while obtaining a vocational degree takes three years. that earning a university degree takes two additional years and that each year increases earnings by about 8 percent, which is around the median value of the estimated returns to a year of higher education as reported in the literature survey by Oreopoulos and Petronijevic (2013) . 36 To derive an estimate for l, we start from our finding that the reform reduces students' age at enrollment by about 0.725 years (see Table 8 ). Our results also suggest that students are more likely to change their major due to the reform (1.6 pp). Assuming that changing one's major prolongs the study duration by one year, we estimate that the reform increases the average working life by l = 0.709 years. The estimates in the previous sections suggest that without the G8 reform, the enrollment rate would be about 6 pp higher, and the dropout rate would be about 1 pp lower (conditional on enrollment). Therefore, we assume that the fraction of individuals with a university degree is 7 pp lower for G8 than for G9 cohorts.
37
On the basis of these numbers, we obtain a positive average individual reform effect of about EUR 15,400 per graduate. The reform's benefits in terms of lifetime earnings still exceed the "costs" of the reform resulting from the adverse reform effects estimated in this study. However, comparing this net benefit to the reform's potential benefit of about EUR 38,800 per graduate (assuming N u G8 = N u G9 and l = 1), our calculations imply that the negative effects of the reform on students' enrollment, their timing, and their study progress strongly reduce the benefits of the reform.
Clearly, these calculations are based on a number of simplifying assumptions and a restrictive definition of the costs and benefits. 38 The calculations do not include nonmonetary costs (for example, stress and less time during school) or benefits (for example, more time for traveling after high school graduation) for affected students. Similarly, from the government's perspective, several costs (for example, printing new school books) and benefits are not considered (for example, fewer school buildings are needed since only eight instead of nine grades are taught at academic high schools).
39
Furthermore, these calculations assume that the annual labor earnings for individuals with/without university degree are the same for G8 and G9 students. Despite these limitations, our calculations suggest that the overall monetary reform effect will be positive. However, the adverse effects obtained in this study strongly reduce the reform's potential benefit.
36. Note that the reviewed studies mainly focus on North America. There is little evidence for the causal effect of university education on earnings for Germany. For robustness purposes, we therefore also work with returns to an additional year of higher education of 4 percent and 12 percent. 37. We calculate N u G8 as the observed posttreatment enrollment rate in the treatment states (0.76) minus the overall dropout rate as provided in Table 1 (0.07) minus the estimated reform effect on the dropout rate (0.01). Hence, N u G8 = 0.68 and N u G9 = N u G8 + 0.07 = 0.75 in our calculations. 38. However, the conclusion of a positive overall effect is quite robust to alternative values for the parameters in Equation 7. If we assume returns to a year of higher education of 4 percent or 12 percent, the overall reform effect is still positive at EUR 22,400 and 8,400, respectively. Clearly, the higher the assumed returns to higher education, the lower the reform's overall benefits. Also, when we assume that l = 0.6 instead of l = 0.709 (that is, G8 students lose even more of their initial age advantage), the reform's net benefit is still positive, but it drops to EUR 11,200. 39. Note, however, that the reform did not change the schools' overall teaching load substantially. Under the G9 regime nine grades were taught on average for at least 29.4 hours per week, while under the G8 regime eight grades were taught on average for at least 33.1 hours per week (see Section II). Therefore, one of the biggest expenses in secondary schooling, teachers' pay, was basically kept constant. The only exception is the transition period, in which the G8 and G9 regime were taught in parallel. During this period, the total number of instruction hours taught at a given school increased (Huebener, Kuger, and Marcus 2017) .
X. Conclusion
We examine whether it is possible to reduce the length of secondary schooling-thereby allowing for an earlier labor market entry-without negatively affecting university enrollment. If it is possible to learn the same amount of material in a shorter period of time, this would mark an efficiency gain for the individual student. This efficiency gain would not only benefit the individual in terms of increased lifetime earnings, but it would also benefit the general public in terms of higher tax revenues and-most importantly-a longer working life, which could help ameliorate the challenges that aging societies face. Against the backdrop of existing evidence on the negative effects of simple reductions in the years of schooling, a novel policy in Germany bears the potential to decrease the length of schooling without affecting students' human capital. This policy reduced the length of the academic high school by one year, but increased weekly instruction hours in the remaining school years in order to fully compensate for the omitted year.
We examine the medium-term consequences of this policy change for higher education decisions. We apply a difference-in-differences approach exploiting the variation in reform implementation over time and across states. Using administrative data from the German Student Register, which covers all students in Germany, we provide evidence for adverse consequences of this policy change: students are less likely to enroll in university, more likely to delay their enrollment, and less likely to make regular study progress. For an illustration of the magnitude of the obtained effect sizes consider the following calculations: 213,000 students graduated from academic high schools in 2014 in the 12 treatment states. Taking our point estimates at face value and assuming effect homogeneity across states and cohorts, our results suggest that, due to the reform, more than 12,000 students in the 2014 graduation cohort did not enroll in university. Additionally, almost 11,000 students delayed their enrollment by one year, and about 4,000 students did not have regular study progress during their first year at university. Although the adverse reform effects on students' enrollment rates, their timing of enrollment, and their study progress strongly reduce the reform's benefits, our cost-benefit calculations suggest that the net benefit of the reform will be positive. Further, we show that these reform impacts are quite general in nature. The effects are similar across states and gender, and they do not seem to be short-lived implementation effects. An investigation of potential channels of the reform suggests that our findings are neither driven by supply-side restrictions nor by the reduction in students' age. Instead, we present evidence based on the German Socio-Economic Panel showing that the main channel works through the higher workload during school because the reform lowers students' performance at school.
Increasing education efficiency by reducing the years of schooling while increasing weekly instruction hours sounds like a tempting policy option. However, our empirical evidence shows that this kind of policy comes with unintended consequences regarding students' higher education decisions. Lower enrollment rates at universities and higher dropout rates may lower a country's human capital stock and, ultimately, economic prosperity. Additionally, by delaying the enrollment decision and by changing majors more often, students lose some of their initial age advantage, thereby counteracting the reform's main goal of earlier labor market entry. Overall, our study suggests that this reform cannot fully eliminate the tradeoff between an earlier labor market entry and constant levels of human capital. However, our study also shows that the reform-induced extended labor market participation is still likely to offset the adverse effects in terms of lifetime earnings.
